Abstract For over a century, assessments of competition or the lack thereof have been central to how public policy treats the telecommunications industry. This centrality continues today. Yet, numerous foundational questions about this concept persist. In this paper, we chronicle how the definition of "competition" has evolved in economics and has been applied in the communications arena. The academic literature on competition hits an important inflection point in the mid-20 th century with the development of "workable competition," a term equated to "e↵ective competition." We find that while the concept of "e↵ective competition" is central to policy formation at the FCC, the Commission's own applications of "e↵ective competition" are inconsistent. Given the centrality of this concept, and its inconsistent applications to date, we draw upon the seminal contributions to the development of the notion of "e↵ective competition" to pro↵er a modern definition suitable for application in 21 st century communications markets.
Introduction
Assessments of competition or the lack thereof have been central to the evolution of public policy in the telecommunications industry for over a century (Weiman and Levin, 1994) . This centrality continues today. For instance, citing competitive concerns, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) chose recently to set aside spectrum for all but the largest two mobile telephony providers (FCC, 2014a) . Similarly, the FCC chose early in 2015 to reclassify broadband services under Title II of the Communications Act citing concerns that, absent expanded regulatory oversight, incumbent broadband providers may anticompetitively forestall both competitors and innovation (FCC, 2015e) .
1 And beyond particular policy decisions, ongoing FCC reports assess competition in local telephony, wireless telephony, and multichannel video programming distribution.
2
Despite this centrality, basic and profound questions remain in telecommunications regarding the definition and measurement of competition, as well as the appropriate institutional oversight mechanisms for competition policy. These questions recently manifested in a white paper o↵ered by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (2014). The paper is part of a series of white papers designed to provoke input on key questions confronting policymakers as they contemplate a major update to the Communications Act of 1934, which was last updated in 1996. The first question the Committee asked is: "How should Congress define competition in the modern communications marketplace?"
3
In response to this and other questions posed by the Committee, 84 parties o↵ered answers, reflections, observations, and recommendations.
4 While the Committee may have hoped for a consensus set of responses, or at least general agreement, a review of the responses finds widely di↵ering opinions. Indeed, despite the importance of this definition to competition policy in the communications industry, the responses to the Committee largely either sidestepped the question or o↵ered inadequate replies. The side-steps largely fall into three categories. Some ignored the question altogether.
5 Some substituted a conclusory assessment regard-ing the state of the (undefined) competition in communications. 6 Others sought to divert attention from a definition, instead urging Congress to focus any attention to competition more narrowly 7 or, alternatively, broadly.
8
For those respondents that did nominally address the Committee's question, the most common approach was to define competition by example, implicitly suggesting that we know competition exists because we see it. A number of respondents provided a litany of examples of what seem to be competitive indicators such as a low market share, a diminishing market share, or a proliferation of perceived competitors.
9 Three di culties arise with this approach. First, it points toward a specific declarative regarding the presence of competition as it now exists and would exist for the foreseeable future. Yet, these same respondents also emphasized the rapid evolution of communications markets.
10 While there is a broad consensus that telecommunications markets have now become more rivalrous, the rapidly evolving nature of telecommunications markets raises the possibility of future market failure. Additionally, while the examples o↵ered as competitive indicators are prolific, it is di cult to know whether these examples prove the presence of competition absent a definition of competition. And, finally, while some respondents provided examples that seem to indicate intuitively the presence of competition, others argued that the relatively concentrated nature of telecommunications markets indicates a lack of competition.
11
But if the respondents largely failed to provide a sound foundation for defining competition, where might legislators and regulators turn to understand this concept? The discipline of economics provides insights, if not a complete resolution.
In this paper, we use the lens of economic analysis to bring focus to the discussion of competition in modern communications markets. While other articles in this issue focus on the specific economics surrounding the FCC's Open Internet Order, this paper provides a complementary, but more primitive, assessment of "competition" with an eye toward not only enhancing our tools for assessing the basic claims regarding the presence or absence of competition as it pertains to the net neutrality debate but also more generally. See, e.g., the responses of: Broadband for America, which stated that there is a "single truth underscor [ing] the importance of any modern communications policy: Fierce competition occurs throughout the Internet eco-system..." (p. 2); CTIA, which stated "the wireless ecosystem is vibrantly competitive, requiring only continued 'light touch' regulations by the FCC" (p. 2); Free State Foundation, which called for a "new Digital Age Communications Act... that requires the FCC to take into account the existence of the increasing cross-platform, facilities-based intermodal competition that characterizes the digital environment" (p. 3); USTelecom, which stated "Rather than attempting to statutorily define competition...definition that will inevitably become outmoded in a very short time...acknowledgement that the communications marketplace has, indeed, become competitive" (pp. 3-4); American Action Forum, which stated "Broadband competition is vigorous, facilities-based and intermodal; while the relevant law is largely siloed" (p. 1).
We begin in Sect. 2 by reviewing how the concept of "competition" has evolved over the history of economic thought. In Sect. 3, we discuss an important inflection point in the mid-20 th century with the development of the concept of "workable competition" and its corollary term, "e↵ective competition," in the policy arena. In Sect. 4, we review the definition and use of the term e↵ective competition in two important sectors overseen by the Federal Communications Commission: cable television and mobile telephony. We find that the various policy applications rely on substantially di↵erent definitions of e↵ective competition. In Sect. 5, we return to the basic question posed by the Committee: how to define competition in the modern communications marketplace. Drawing upon the core elements of the academic concept of e↵ective competition, we o↵er a straightforward and robust definition for application to 21 st century communications markets. Like virtually every economic concept in the policy arena, our pro↵ered definition would be subject to pressures from interests that would seek to advance their cause for more, or less, governmental intervention into telecommunications markets. Nonetheless, this definition rooted in the discipline of economics holds the promise to smartly guide policy in the rapidly evolving communications markets of the 21 st century.
The Evolution of "Competition" in Economic Thought
At its most primal level competition is rivalry. In business, rivalrous actions are intended to secure the patronage of consumers. Most often, competition provokes firms to take actions that benefit consumers. Competition is routinely attributed to be a cause of improved firm-level e ciency, lower prices, increased quality, accelerated innovation, and more rapid development of new services. For these reasons, for at least 125 years, policymakers in the United States have championed the cause of preserving and promoting competition. 12 Yet while generally agreeing that competition is desirable, the House Committee white paper asks a more basic question: how should policymakers define competition? This question is crucially important. Without a clear and shared understanding of what marketplace characteristics and activities constitute competition, well-meaning but misguided policy interventions may inadvertently harm competition through actions intended to promote it; or alternatively, when competition is inadequate, policymakers may fail to intervene under a mistaken belief that existing competition levels are adequate to protect consumers.
The subject of competition has been central in economics since the writings of the mercantilists of the 17 th century (Dennis, 1977, p. xii) . Mercantilists believed that competition occurred between nations via international trade. The focus on more atomistic competition between firms emerged with the writings of the physiocrats and ultimately gained prominence through the work of Adam Smith. Smith provided a now central tenant of capitalism that competition among selfinterested actors commonly promotes the aggregate economic welfare of society at large.
13 Additionally, Smith provides context by contrasting competition with
12
See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § §1 -7.
13
See, e.g., Smith (1937 Smith ( /1776 , stating, "... where the competition is free, the rivalship of competitors, who are all endeavouring to justle [sic] one another out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his work with a certain degree of exactness." He goes on to state, "But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable monopoly (Dennis, 1977, p. 96) . And he notes as well that competition "disciplines" and "regulates" firm behavior (Dennis, 1977, p. 100) . For all the value of Smith's linking competition to the social outcomes, his concept of competition "is solely equilibrating in tendency and thereby a principle of order and stability rather than change" (Dennis, 1977, p. 101) . It was not until the 20 th century that Schumpeter (1942) pro↵ered a vision of competition as a fundamental source of disequilibrium (and growth) in markets.
Beginning with Smith, the word and concept of competition has often been conjoined with an adjective. Smith emphasized "free" competition. Smith's use of the word "free" emphasized the notion that the competition he envisioned was one in which individuals and firms could freely enter to compete for consumers' patronage. Against a medieval backdrop in which entry into professions and particular lines of commerce was heavily regulated, the adjective "free" brought two special purposes. First, it provided a reinforcing notion of individual liberty that was a common theme throughout Smith's writings. Second, it provided a marker for economists for the next two centuries that would emphasize the important role that economically "free" entry can have for the ability of markets to promote e cient resource allocation.
14
In the years after Smith's treatise, economists have honed, refined, and parsed the notion of competition. Prominent economists of the 19 th century began to refer to "the law of competition" referring to the general propensity of competition to drive prices to an equilibrium level.
15 Later still, economists came to qualify the word competition with "perfect." Today, the model of "perfect competition" provides a standard introduction for students of economics into the equilibrium tendencies of markets characterized by perfectly free entry, atomistic firms selling a homogeneous product or service and perfectly informed buyers and sellers.
16
As a theoretical model it provides a powerful congruence of competition with the economic e ciencies anticipated by Smith some 240 years ago.
By the mid-20 th century, however, it was widely recognized that many if not most modern markets had characteristics that strained the then-standard characterization of perfect competition. Firms in advanced capitalistic societies are often large in both absolute and relative terms, sell mildly-to-highly di↵erentiated goods, and operate in markets that are subject to at least modest barriers to entry. Ironically, a core element of competition (viz., rivalry) is absent from the perfectly competitive model as firms in this market model do not compete with each other in value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more e↵ectually than when he really intends to promote it." 14 Economically "free" entry does not, of course, literally mean that the cost for firms to enter markets is zero but rather that barriers to entry are minimal.
15
E.g., Ricardo (1811/1887), George (1879 George ( /1920 , §2 ¶10), Mill (1848) .
16
E.g., Katz and Rosen (1998, pp. 327-331) .
the sense of reacting to a rival's actions, but instead simply respond to anonymous market forces.
This disconnect compelled fresh thinking among economists who began serious e↵orts to develop models of imperfect competition that may more accurately take into account the structural aspects of modern markets.
17 In imperfectly competitive market models, firms compete with each other by accounting for and reacting to rivals' behaviors. E↵orts to model imperfectly competitive models, however, have not been the silver bullet economists had sought. An early attempt to construct a general model of imperfect competition was criticized for its overreaching generality and its tendency to envision all competition as "monopolistic" (Stigler, 1956) . Game theoretic models of competition, which have the virtue of explicitly modelling rivals' strategic reactions to each other, provided specific insights under particular assumptions. Yet the equilibrium outcomes of these models vary from very desirable economic outcomes (i.e., high output and low prices) to less "competitive" (lower output and higher prices) outcomes. Consequently, no general theory of imperfect competition has arisen that captures, or anticipates, the general economic behavior of firms in modern markets.
3 Workable (E↵ective) Competition
The 20 th -century incongruity between the simplistic (and potentially misleading) model of perfect competition and the structure of many modern markets naturally triggered debate about the concept of competition and the appropriate policy toward competition. In the 1940s, this discourse found a new and promising pathway. John Maurice Clark (1940) , a prominent early 20 th -century economist, argued passionately for a new concept of competition. He noted that models of imperfect competition, while "current," were in "an unformulated state" for applications of economic policy. He further noted that scrutinizing the model of perfect competition had led economists to realize that "'perfect competition' does not and cannot exist and has presumably never existed for reasons quite apart from any inescapable tendency toward collusion, such as Adam Smith noted in his familiar remark on the gettings-together of members of a trade" (p. 241).
To advance a better platform, he defined competition as follows:
Competition is rivalry in selling goods, in which each selling unit normally seeks maximum net revenue, under conditions such that the price or prices each seller can charge are e↵ectively limited by the free option of the buyer to buy from a rival seller or sellers of what we think of as "the same" product, necessitating an e↵ort by each seller to equal or exceed the attractiveness of the others' o↵erings to a su cient number of [buyers] to accomplish the end in view (p. 243, emphasis added ).
This definition provides the core of Clark's theory of "workable competition," a term he and others came to use interchangeably with "e↵ective competition" (Clark, 1961) . Clark emphasizes three key features of competition: (1) rivalry among sellers, (2) the "free option" of buyers to buy from alternative vendors, and (3) e↵orts by sellers to equal or exceed the attractiveness of others' o↵erings. Clark's definition provides guidance for identifying firms that are subject to workable competition and for o↵ering policy guidance. Workable competition admits the prospect that industries may, "despite large-scale production, have the characteristics of fairly healthy and workable imperfect competition, rather than those of slightly-qualified monopoly" (Clark, 1940, p. 256) . On the policy front, Clark concludes that where markets deviate from structural conditions of perfect competition but are, nonetheless, workably competitive, "one may hope that government need not assume the burden of doing something about every departure from the model of perfect competition" (p. 256).
Once introduced, the concept of workable competition gained immediate traction in both the academic and political communities.
19 Joe Bain, attributed to be the father of modern industrial organization economics, scrutinized Clark's vision of workable competition, finding much merit in the concept. As he observed, Clark's notion of workable competition "include[ed] a rather e↵ective answer to those who would hold that all oligopoly tends to approximate pure monopoly behavior, or that reasonably satisfactory results are possible only if all oligopolists price independently on a price-equals-marginal-cost basis" (1950, p. 36) .
Bain noted that determining whether a market was workably competitive would require an empirical assessment of performance along several dimensions. He further correctly observed that successfully assessing the workability of competition requires judging the empirical results of the analysis against some "ideals or goals of performance" as well as providing some clear sense of the acceptable degree of deviation from these ideals (1950, p. 37) .
The original definition of workable competition fashioned by Clark is both straightforward and, with Bain's caveats duly noted, seemingly a "workable" tool for economists as they consider the merits of turning up or down the regulation of an industry. Following Clark's original exposition of workable competition, however, economic analyses proceeded by continuing to alter the definition of what constituted a workably competitive market and by generating an ever-growing list of criteria that were seen as necessary to render a confident conclusion that a market was, in fact, workably competitive. These developments ultimately caused a muddling of the clean concept. By 1957, one prominent economist wryly noted that " [t] here are as many definitions of 'e↵ective' or 'workable' competition as there are e↵ective or working economists" (Mason, 1957, p. 381) . The list of criteria too became unwieldy. One study went so far as to argue that "a market is e↵ectively competitive if and only if it is free of 25 flaws" (Sosnick, 1968, p. 827, emphasis added ) .
20 Future Nobel laureate George Stigler added the criticism that the factors identified as congruent with e↵ective competition were "simply parts of the theory of perfect competition restated in homely language" (1956, p. 505 See, e.g., Wilcox (1940) . 20 These flaws included unsatisfactory products, underuse or overuse, ine cient exchange, ine cient production, bad externalities, spoliation, exploitation, unfair tactics, wasteful advertising, irrationality, undue profits or losses, inadequate research, predation, pre-emption, tying arrangements, resale price maintenance, refusals to deal, undesirable discrimination, misallocation of risk, undesirable mergers, undesirable entry, misinformation, ine cient rules of trading, and misregulation. criteria for labeling a market "workably competitive" had not created greater clarity, but instead clutter and ambiguity. And the ever growing set of criteria also made labelling a market as "e↵ectively competitive" more stringent than labelling it "perfectly competitive." Stigler's cutting synthesis concluded, "[t]o determine whether an industry is workably competitive, therefore, simply have a good graduate student write his dissertation on the industry and render a verdict. It is crucial to this test, of course, that no second graduate student be allowed to study the industry" (p. 505). Another poignant critique concluded that the erosion of the concept from its original form was not due to failures of classical economic thought, but rather failures of those "who fell into the bad habit of equating competition with pure competition, of confusing theoretical benchmarks with policy norms, of expecting highly monopolistic behavior in most markets where competitors are few" (Peterson, 1957, pp. 76-77) .
While theoretically adrift, the increasingly ill-defined concept of workable competition also ran a risk of providing a misleading policy tool. As pointed out by Stigler (1956), "[b] ecause [the concept of workable competition] does not focus upon the alternatives open to the society in a given situation, it is misleading: sometimes nothing can be done with an unworkable industry; sometimes a workable situation can be improved" (p. 505). This important insight points toward the need, when considering policy directed toward any industry, to consider not only observable behaviors of firms within a market but also the costs and e↵ectiveness of governmental policies designed to remedy perceived market shortcomings. Fortunately, as Jesse Markham observed, a definitional refinement helps circumvent the policy trap identified by Stigler: A possible alternative approach to the concept of workable competition may be one which shifts the emphasis from a set of specific structural characteristics to an appraisal of a particular industry's over-all performance against the background of possible remedial action. Definitions of workable competition shaped along these lines might accept as a first approximation some such principle as the following: An industry may be judged to be workably competitive when, after the structural characteristics of its market and the dynamic forces that shaped them have been thoroughly examined, there is no clearly indicated change that can be e↵ected through public policy measures that would result in greater social gains than social losses (Markham, 1950, p. 361 , emphasis added ).
E↵ective Competition in Policy Practice
Following the introduction of e↵ective competition to the academic literature, the concept was quickly integrated into policy usage. Its first appearances in the policy arena were limited to federal tax and procurement policy applications. As early as 1944, the term "e↵ective competition" appeared in an IRS Bulletin referencing an exemption from stringent wartime contract policies if competitive conditions were likely to result in e↵ective competition for the contract (U.S. Treasury Department, 1944 Department, , pp. 807, 961, 1048 . Similar early references to e↵ective competition appear in procurement clauses related to telecommunications and the military. 21 Missing 21 See, e.g., the Satellite Communications Act of 1962, Public Law No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419, codified at 47 U.S.C. ch. 6 §701 et seq, which directed the FCC to "insure e↵ective from these early policy directives was any definition of "e↵ective competition." When certain sections did incorporate definitions much later, they tended to focus on the presence of two or more rivals.
22
In the 1970s, "e↵ective competition" found its way into freight railroad policy. In the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Congress declared that the Interstate Commerce Commission could not judge a rate for rail service to be unreasonable unless it first determined that the carrier in question held "market dominance," which it defined to be the "absence of e↵ective competition" from either other rail carriers or other modes of transportation.
23 It did not, however, define "e↵ective competition."
Apart from procurement applications, it appears that the first meaningful discussions in communications of competition and "e↵ective competition" in particular began in the 1980s. In a 1985 FCC O ce of Plans and Policies working paper, John Haring wrote:
Competition is a process of discovery and adaptation, not a particular distribution of market shares. Any configuration of market shares may be consistent with e↵ective competition or noncompetitive performance... Whether competition is 'e↵ective' depends primarily on the degree of resource mobility in the economy. It has little to do with the distribution of market shares prevailing at any point in time, particularly when shares are determined by regulation rather than competition (1985, p. 2, emphasis in original ).
In 1993, the FCC began to define e↵ective competition in a proceeding involving the entry of foreign telecommunications carriers into the U.S.: "E↵ective competition means competition among service providers in a market that benefits consumers by expanding service o↵erings, promoting development of innovative technology, and lowering prices" (FCC, 1995b, ¶1) . While establishing a definition that appeared congruent with Clark's foundational definition, the FCC has vacillated in other policy areas in which the definition of e↵ective competition is central to policy. We now turn to those areas.
competition, including the use of competitive bidding where appropriate, in the procurement by the corporation and communications common carriers of apparatus, equipment, and services required for the establishment and operation of the communications satellite system and satellite terminal stations..." See also An Act of July 5, 1968 to amend section 2306 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize certain contracts for services and related supplies to extend beyond one year, Public Law 90-378, 82 Stat. 289, which permitted the armed forces to enter multi-year contracts so long as, among other requirements, "the use of such a contract will promote the best interests of the United States by encouraging e↵ective competition and promoting economies in operation." See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §34.001 (1986), which defines e↵ective competition within the Federal Acquisition Regulations System for major acquisitions as, "a market condition that exists when two or more contractors, acting independently, actively contend for the Government's business in a manner which ensures that the Government will be o↵ered the lowest cost or price alternative or best technical design meeting its minimum needs." The definition was first added into this section of code in 1986. 
E↵ective Competition in Cable TV
The concept of e↵ective competition was present at the FCC, 24 but it did not take concrete steps to employ the concept as a benchmark for regulation telecomminications until the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 compelled the agency to define the term for the purposes of cable regulation.
25 The FCC, operating on a strict Congressionally-dictated timetable for adopting a standard, initially settled on a finding of e↵ective competition if at least three non-duplicated over-the-air broadcast signals were receivable within the cable system's market area. This standard was implemented as an exemption criteria from rate regulation, and ultimately resulted in rate deregulation for 96 percent of the cable industry (House of Representatives, 1992, p. 31), and remained in e↵ect (with minor revisions and clarifications 26 ) until 1991. The FCC monitored the relevance of its definition, and sta↵ analysis of 1988 viewership data found lack of support for the three-signal standard as a true finding of e↵ective competition. Consequently, the FCC began reexamining the e↵ective competition standard to reflect the changed circumstances of the video marketplace. This time, the FCC dedicated seventeen months to exploring various criteria for e↵ective competition, and settled on a two-pronged definition for the existence of e↵ective competition. One of two alternatives must be met: (1) at least six unduplicated Grade B broadcast signals 27 must be available in the relevant market, and cable system penetration in the market must be less than fifty percent; or (2), at least one independently owned multichannel video service must be available to at least fifty percent of viewers in the relevant market and actually subscribed to by at least ten percent of the potential viewers in the market (FCC, 1991 E.g., the FCC made revisions in 1988 per direction of the U.S. Court of Appeals-after a case brought against the FCC by the ACLU-to require one hundred percent of the community receive three Grade B signals, although they not necessarily be the same three signals throughout the whole community, and also to use community-wide rather than county-wide data to determine whether a signal qualifies as "significantly viewed." See FCC (1988). 27 A "Grade B" broadcast signal was defined as the field strength of a television broadcast station computed in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to 47 USC §522 (11). 28 The prevailing argument made by the cable providers at this time in defense of this accusation had two parts: first, that prices had been artificially low during the period of regulation prior to the 1984 Act, and second, that in the period of deregulation, the industry o↵erings had significantly improved and that merited a price increase.
e↵ective competition changed again.
29 Any of three conditions would demonstrate the presence of e↵ective competition: (1), when fewer than thirty percent of the households in the system's franchise area subscribe to the operator's service; (2), if the franchise area is served by at least two multichannel video programming distributors, each of which o↵ers comparable programming to at least fifty percent of the franchise area's households and also if more than fifteen percent of the franchise area's households subscribe to service o↵ered by the distributor other than the largest one in the area; or (3), when the area's franchising authority operates a multichannel video programming service available to at least fifty percent of the households in the area. The FCC was required to implement these controversial changes and define certain Congressionally-undefined aspects of the law's standard for e↵ective competition. As a procedural mechanism, the FCC o cially adopted the presumption of no e↵ective competition during the implementation of the 1992 Cable Act (FCC, 1993) .
Just four years later, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with the stated goal of increasing competition and reducing regulation. This act again altered the definition of e↵ective competition in the cable industry, this time broadening the scope to include competition from a local exchange carrier's facilities o↵ering video programming services comparable to the o↵erings of cable operators.
30 In line with the act's stated goal of promoting competition and reducing regulation, the definition also eliminated many situations in which a determination of e↵ective competition would be necessary to exempt a service provider from rate regulation.
After the FCC implemented the act (1996), the percentage of cable service providers found to be subject to e↵ective competition rose, albeit slowly initially, but then more rapidly. 31 In particular, as the new technology of direct broadcast satellite (DBS) developed and DBS coverage became nearly ubiquitous, DBS came to be seen as a ready driver of e↵ective competition among other multichannel programming video providers (MVPDs). As competition was increasingly seen as e↵ective, the regulatory presumption that cable companies did not face e↵ective competition absent a rigorous demonstration was seen as burdensome regulation.
Against this backdrop, the STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014 32 gave the FCC a mandate to reevaluate the usage of the e↵ective competition standard. Specifically, under mandate of Congressional order to "establish a streamlined 29 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Public Law 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1465, codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § §521-555. 30 The act provided, in addition to the previous three criteria-low penetration, competing providers, or the presence of a municipal provider-of e↵ective competition, a definition for "local exchange carrier e↵ective competition" if a local exchange carrier or its a liate or any MVPD using the facilities of such carrier or its a liate o↵ers video programming services directly to subscribers by any means other than direct-to-home satellite service in the franchise area of an una liated cable operator which is providing cable service in that franchise area, but only if the video programming services so o↵ered in that area are comparable to the video programming services provided by the una liated cable operator in that area. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Public Law 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 115, §301(b)(3). 31 In 1997, for example, the FCC issued decisions determining the presence of e↵ective competition in forty-five communities with approximately 300,000 subscribers. The majority of successful e↵ective competition petitions in 1997 were based on the local exchange carrier test for e↵ective competition. See FCC (1998a). process for filing of an e↵ective competition petition pursuant to this section for small cable operators, particularly those who serve primarily rural areas," the FCC revisited the presumption determining the presence or absence of e↵ective competition in the cable industry (FCC, 2015b). As the FCC had noted in its annual competition reports, it had denied fewer and fewer petitions for determination since 1993, and in only half a percent of the communities evaluated since 2012 had there been insu cient evidence for a finding of e↵ective competition (FCC, 2015a) . With DBS service providing nearly universal coverage in the U. S. (FCC, 2015c, ¶ ¶26-28) and generally fulfilling the requirements for the competing provider e↵ective competition test (FCC, 2015b, ¶9) , in June 2015 the FCC alleviated the burden of petitioning for small (and large) cable operators by adopting a rebuttable presumption of competing provider e↵ective competition (FCC, 2015b, ¶ ¶13-16).
In sum, both the definition and policy determination of e↵ective competition in cable TV provision have vacillated over the years. Over the years, the FCC has alternatively defined "e↵ective competition" to be a number of competitors greater than or equal to three, six, or two. At times, the FCC has focused solely on the number of competitors, while at other time it has incorporated an additional focus on market shares, measured, at times, using capacity or customers, and, alternatively at di↵erent times focusing on the market share of the largest-or smallest-provider in the marketplace. In short, the only consistency over the years has been the inconsistency with which policymakers have defined e↵ective competition in the MVPD marketplace.
E↵ective Competition in Mobile Wireless
The FCC began a formal annual review of the state of "competitive market conditions with respect to commercial mobile services" after Congress passed legislation requiring it in 1993.
33 Unlike the case of cable TV, however, Congress did not dictate the definition or terms of e↵ective competition for mobile telephony. The law simply required that the FCC include "an analysis of whether or not there is e↵ective competition," as well as "identification of the number of competitors in various commercial mobile services" and "whether any of such competitors have a dominant share of the market for such services." In the wake of such flexibility, the FCC's approach to the annual reporting requirement changed substantially over the years since 1993.
Initially, the FCC did not explicitly comply with all parts of the law outlining the contents of the annual report. In particular, the FCC described the industry's competitive metrics and trends without making a finding of e↵ective competition or lack thereof in the first seven reports. The term "e↵ective competition" does not appear in many of the reports, except for citations to the law motivating the report.
34 Surprisingly, the FCC's neither defining e↵ective competition nor attesting to its presence or absence did not prove particularly controversial despite being a blatant contravention of a major component of its reporting requirement. This was perhaps based in the presence of phrases such as "less than fully competitive" (FCC, 1995a, ¶4), and "undergoing major changes that have resulted in growing See, e.g., FCC 1995a FCC , 1997 FCC , 1998b FCC , 1999 competition" (FCC, 1995a, ¶2) , which hinted at the absence of e↵ective competition without requiring a conclusion. Later reports similarly hinted at progression toward an e↵ectively competitive industry, which allowed the FCC to broach the topic of e↵ective competition without specifically concluding that the industry had yet become e↵ective competitive.
35 Over time, both the extent of data upon which the reports were based and the analyses of those data expanded considerably.
36
By the release of the Eighth Report in 2003, the FCC's perception of competitive growth in the mobile wireless industry led to a conclusion that the industry could be characterized by e↵ective competition. Improvement in the quality and granularity of the underlying data was also revealed in the Eighth Report (FCC, 2003) .
37
Still, the Eighth Report's finding of e↵ective competition was not predicated on a specific definition or set of criteria for e↵ective competition. The Eighth Report did, however, manage to set a precedent, and each of the following six reports continued to conclude that e↵ective competition was present in the mobile wireless industry, despite never referencing a definition for the term or stating the criteria for such.
The FCC's changed methodology and approach to assessing competition did not go unnoticed. Internally, Commissioner Michael J. Copps criticized it. Commissioner Copps argued for the need to "establish a definition of 'e↵ective competition' and a standard for determining when such competition exists" stating that "merely listing possible relevant areas of inquiry is far di↵erent from having a rigorous method of determining whether current market characteristics mean that there is adequate competition" and that "[w]ithout more rigor, without an articulated 'e↵ective competition' standard, the Report is of limited use in providing an analytically solid foundation for Commission or Congressional action" (FCC, 2003, p. 14784) . Copps reiterated his views upon the release of the following four competition reports.
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See, e.g., a statement in the Fourth Report, "While there is still considerable room for further competitive development, the e↵ects of the progress to date are clear" (FCC 1999, p. 10207) . 36 The First Report (FCC, 1995a) was composed almost entirely of a discussion of various mobile services and how they complemented each other, with some generalized price ranges for those products and broad subscription statistics, although it did reference goals for how the reporting would improve by the time of the Second Report. By the time of the Fifth Report (FCC, 2000) , the length of the report had more than quadrupled, and included a much more broad selection of sector descriptors. Regarding advancements in data, prior to the Seventh Report, the Commission based its analysis solely on publicly available data sources, but incorporated the "Numbering Resource Utilization / Forecast" data in the Seventh Report (FCC, 2002) , and also conducted a public forum in February 2002 to collect further data.
37 FCC Chairman issued a statement as part of the report stating, "This is the most comprehensive wireless competition report that the Commission has ever produced and I applaud the e↵orts of the Wireless Bureau to update, verify, and diversify our data to better capture the state of the marketplace" (FCC, 2003, p. 14783) .
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E.g., Copps remarked: "... the Report still contains arguments and omissions that trouble me. The central question of the legislation that requires this Report is whether the market is characterized by 'e↵ective competition.' Yet again this year, the Report does not provide a useful definition of this term" (FCC, 2004, p. 20720) . "Congress tasked us with doing 'an analysis of whether or not there is e↵ective competition' in commercial mobile services. Yet still we fail to define 'e↵ective competition'-and this limits the ability of the Commission and the Congress to rely on our results" (FCC, 2005, p. 16014) . "The need for a clearly-stated, objectively-measurable definition of 'e↵ective competition' gets more compelling every year...Our conclusion that competition remains e↵ective [ ] would be more credible if we had defined that term ahead of time and then assessed whether current competition data meets our definition" While Copps was alone in his views within the FCC, outside the Commission, others supported the development of an e↵ective competition standard. Notably, a 2006 report of the U. S. Government Accountability O ce (GAO) concluded that the FCC needed to "develop a meaningful and workable definition of e↵ective competition" (GAO, 2006, p. 43) , which it characterized as a proxy of true consumer choice.
39 Upon review, the managing director of the FCC, Anthony Dale, commented that developing such a definition would be "administratively impracticable" because "there is no universally accepted, bright-line definition of 'e↵ective competition'" and questioned the recommendation to define and "measure e↵ective competition on a granular basis" on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the deregulatory goals of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The GAO responded that: (1) the FCC was in the best position of any entity to accomplish this task, despite its complexities; (2) defining e↵ective competition was "a relevant and important task for the requisite federal regulatory body;" and, (3) the "FCC would be significantly hindered in its ability to fulfill its regulatory responsibilities and statutory goals of promoting competition if it cannot define competition, does not have measurable goals, and does not collect and analyze reliable data on the state of competition for dedicated access" (GAO, 2006, p. 46) .
In January 2009, Commissioner Copps stepped in as Acting Chairman of the FCC a mere six days following the release of the Thirteenth Report. During his brief tenure in this role, the wireless bureau approached the task of articulating the components of an e↵ectively competitive industry. With a Public Notice in May 2009, the FCC launched preparations for the Fourteenth Report, and along with the usual requests for data and anecdotes regarding industry developments, the FCC finally requested feedback on which "specific criteria should be used to determine whether there is 'e↵ective competition' among [mobile wireless] providers" (FCC, 2009b, p. 5619) . The Public Notice referenced a variety of interpretations of what could constitute e↵ective competition, and asked whether it "should continue to consider a range of indicators in determining whether e↵ective competition is prevalent in [the mobile wireless] marketplace or define e↵ective competition in a more specific manner" (p. 5620). The Public Notice also mentioned some of the definitions explored within public policy practice and economics literature and inquired whether the definition of an e↵ectively "competitive market [as] one that requires no intervention to improve its performance" should be considered "in conjunction with the metrics and factors currently analyzed" (p. 5621).
However, few of the comments addressed this topic. Most of the fourteen commenters ignored the opportunity to shape a definition for e↵ective competition and simply addressed other aspects of the Public Notice, focusing on concerns regarding consolidation in the industry or perceived impediments to competition stemming from roaming and exclusive handset agreements.
40 Others dismissed the importance of defining e↵ective competition and stated that the FCC should (FCC, 2006, p. 11070, emphasis in original) . See also his comments in the Twelfth Report (FCC, 2008) .
39 This was in marked contrast to earlier reports which focused more on the weaknesses of the data underlying previous reports. See, e.g., GAO (2003) .
40
See, e.g., comments from Cellular South, Cricket, the Rural Telecommunications Group, MetroPCS, and Brighthouse Networks, among others of FCC (2009a).
continue to approach the topic as it had in the Eighth through Thirteenth Reports, or expressed that the FCC was incapable of generating a useful definition.
41
Soon after the comment and reply-comment period for the Public Notice had closed, the newly confirmed Chairman of the FCC, Julius Genachowski, announced a goal of "upgrading [the] competition reports across the board to provide important information to all stakeholders and to create solid, fact-based foundations for predictable policy" (FCC, 2010, p. 11700) , which appeared congruent to developing a definition of e↵ective competition. When the Fourteenth Report was released, however, rather than elaborate on criteria for e↵ective competition, the FCC simply reversed its position on the feasibility of finding the presence or absence of e↵ective competition in the industry stating, " [t] he mobile wireless ecosystem is su ciently complex such that no single definition of e↵ective competition adequately encompasses both general indicators of competition and challenges inherent in the mobile wireless industry, such as spectrum availability, network interconnection issues, and network access issues" (FCC, 2010, p. 11435) . The FCC further justified its stance by referencing the lack of consensus on the definition of e↵ective competition among economists and competition policy authorities as the driving reason they failed to make a finding for or against e↵ective competition. Chairman Genachowski posited that an "overly-simplistic yes-or-no conclusion about the overall level of competition in this complex and dynamic ecosystem" would be at odds with the FCC's role "as a fact-based and data-driven agency" (FCC, 2010, p. 11701) .
Similar to the first seven reports, although accompanied by a much more granular description of the industry, the FCC's Fourteenth Report assessed mobile telephony market conditions without providing a conclusory assessment regarding the presence of e↵ective competition. Unlike those first seven reports, however, the Fourteenth Report did not imply that e↵ective competition did not exist. Rather, what conclusions should be drawn from the report were simply left to the reader. There was not even consensus among the various commissioners on how to interpret the report. Commissioner Meredith Baker applauded the thoroughness of the report, but stated, "we should have made an a rmative finding of a competitive market based on the year-over-year trends set forth in the Report and the significant consumer opportunities and investment provided by the wireless industry" and "[the Report's] data demonstrate a vibrant competitive environment across the mobile wireless sector" (FCC, 2010, p. 11708) . Commissioner Robert McDowell argued that there was not "new or particularly revealing information that would prevent us from opining as to 'whether or not there is e↵ective competition '" and "[i] f nothing else, the report shows that the wireless sector is dynamic, ever-improving, and responsive to consumer demand" (FCC, 2010, p. 11704) . Given Commissioner Copps' repeated calls for the FCC to define "e↵ective competition," surprisingly, he complimented the new report's format, calling it, "the kind of comprehensive and granular analysis that [he had] been looking for." Copps then went on to emphasize a growth in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index value within the mobile telephony market, which he thought heralded the "dramatic[] ero [sion] " and "serious[] endanger[ment]" of competition "by continuing consolidation and concentration in the wireless markets" (FCC, 2010, p. 11702) . Commissioner Mignon Clyburn also applauded the report and expressed her fears about rural consumers without "meaningful choices among providers" (FCC, 2010, p. 11707) .
The new unwillingness of the FCC to conclude that the mobile wireless market was e↵ectively competitive was seen by many as a change in the FCC's opinion of the competitive levels in the market, and correspondingly, a harbinger of impending greater regulation of the wireless industry. Unsurprisingly, this report was met with public outcry, in particular from those companies that never expected the FCC might change its stance so dramatically and so quickly.
42 Despite this public outcry, the Fourteenth Report set a new course for the following four reports. Through the publication of the Eighteenth Report, the FCC continued to analyze a collection of competitive attributes of the mobile wireless industry without defining e↵ective competition or making a finding that the market is or is not e↵ectively competitive.
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Our review of the FCC's approach to "e↵ective competition" in mobile telephone markets indicates that without a clear definition to guide its analysis of competition, the FCC has expended substantial e↵ort on mobile competition reports that are ultimately just as haphazard in their approach as the arbitrary rules surrounding e↵ective competition in the cable industry. This approach could have been improved at any point in the last twenty-two years by establishing a definition of e↵ective competition. It is to that e↵ort that we now turn.
"Competition" for 21 st

Century Communications Markets
Collectively the last two sections indicate that: (1) after a promising start the definition of workable (e↵ective) competition became excessively burdened and muddied in the academic realm; and, (2) despite the absence of an agreed upon definition of the term, "e↵ective competition" was nonetheless adopted by policymakers who have based critical decisions regarding the level of regulation or deregulation of various industries on determinations of whether the market at hand was, indeed, e↵ectively competitive. As we have seen, however, the lack of definition permits inconsistent and vacillating interpretations in the policy realm, with little or no reliance on the economic underpinnings associated with the concept. Consequently, a rigorous definition of "competition" that is capable of smartly guiding economic 42 E.g., AT&T had previously posited that any "rational definition" would surely indicate the presence of e↵ective competition (FCC, 2009a, AT&T, p. 5) . The change in the FCC's position also garnered substantive academic criticism; e.g., Faulhaber, et al. (2012) . 43 FCC Commissioner Robert McDowell continued to criticize this decision not to make a finding for/against e↵ective competition until his retirement, and was also joined by Commissioner Ajit Pai, noting, "For what it's worth, the answer is pretty obvious to me: Yes, there is e↵ective competition" (FCC, 2013, p. 4174) . Commissioner Ajit Pai and Commissioner Michael O'Rielly were particularly critical of the FCC's stance at the release of the Eighteenth Report, with O'Rielly stating " [it] amazes me that with more than 90 percent of Americans having a choice of four or more wireless providers that we are incapable of concluding, as directed by Congress, whether this industry is competitive" (FCC, 2015g) , and Pai casting aspersions on the reasons for the FCC's failure to make a finding of e↵ective competition, "The bottom line: this FCC will never find that there is e↵ective competition in the wireless market, regardless of what the facts show. That's because doing so would undermine the agency's goal of expanding its authority to manipulate the wireless market-a goal it can't accomplish if it deems that market healthy" (FCC, 2015f, emphasis in original).
policy for the 21 st century does not readily spring from a continuation or simple modification of "e↵ective competition" as historically used by the FCC.
This does not, however, mean that a sound definition is not possible. Nor does it mean that a definition must be constructed de novo. Rather we o↵er a definition rooted in the lineage of economic thought on competition. Three pillars form the foundation. First, we begin by emphasizing the basic definition o↵ered by J. M. Clark (1940) , who argued that the notion that workable or e↵ective competition has three core elements: (1) rivalry among sellers; (2) the free option of buyers to buy from alternative vendors; and, (3) e↵orts by sellers to equal or exceed the attractiveness of others' o↵erings. Second, as elaborated by Bain and Qualls (1987) , "workable ... competition in markets is revealed by, and is the result of, whatever gives rise to satisfactory or workable performance-performance that enhances economic welfare to a reasonable degree" (p. 10).
44 Finally, to the extent that e↵ective competition serves as a trigger for policy intervention in markets, Markham's insight becomes a requisite element of any sound policy application of e↵ective competition. In particular, in the absence of a "clearly indicated change that can be e↵ected through public policy measures that would result in greater social gains than social losses" (Markham, 1950, p. 361) , the market may be considered e↵ectively competitive.
45 Taking these considerations together, a market can be said to be e↵ectively competitive when:
1. Firms exhibit overt rivalry in their quest for consumer patronage; 2. Consumers have choices among vendors, readily demonstrate their ability to change vendors, and vendors (either incumbent or de novo) have the ability and propensity to expand output to satisfy consumer demands; 3. Rivalry among vendors manifests itself in desirable economic performance metrics, including price, output, quality, investment, and innovation; and 4. No clearly indicated and cost-e↵ective policy change can improve upon prevailing economic performance in the market at issue.
Although rooted in the initial definition of workable competition, this modern definition is manageable, avoiding the encumbrances that hindered its early progress in the academic arena.
46 It o↵ers a consistent foundation for policy analysis, creating the possibility that assessments of market competition will not vacillate depending on the ideological mood of Congress, regulators, or the public.
47 It has the advantage of being grounded in measureable indicators about which consumers are likely to care deeply: do they face choices of vendors, can they readily change vendors, do firms actively vie for their patronage, and are they benefiting from marketplace rivalry? Additionally, while laying a foundation for the assessment of competition 44 As a practical matter, this feature of e↵ective competition embodies the prospect that Schumpeterian-style competition for a market (as opposed to the more traditionally-conceived competition within a market) is su ciently powerful that the market generates desirable performance characteristics despite high levels of market concentration. 45 This early call for an assessment of the policy e↵ectiveness of market interventions is more recently repeated by the Department of Justice when it noted that"[t]he operative question in competition policy is whether there are policy levers that can be used to produce superior outcomes, not whether the market resembles the textbook model of perfect competition" (2010, p. 11) .
46
See the discussion in Sect. 3. 47 For evidence of such vacillation in regulatory and deregulatory measures over the past half-century, see Mayo (2013) .
in 21
st century markets, the definition is su ciently congruent with current FCC undertakings regarding competition that adopting it as a standard would not require significant departures from current practices and policies. For instance, the modern e↵ective competition standard would require very few changes in data collection and analysis commonly conducted by the FCC.
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While o↵ering advantages for communications markets, relying on a definition of "e↵ective competition" will surely raise both anticipated and unanticipated challenges. An anticipated challenge of the modern definition is that it, like its early predecessor, provokes assessments of performance without providing a clear, brightline determination of performance standards that would be su cient for rendering a market e↵ectively competitive. Nonetheless, benchmark analysis is possible and in many cases may provide clear judgments. Another anticipated challenge that the modern definition will face is that, although it provides a direction for analysis, advocates are likely to seek to hijack its application for their own ends. This challenge, however, is not new. Indeed, self-serving advocates are likely to find it more di cult to manipulate policy toward their narrow self-interests with the definition in place. And, as noted above, by establishing the modern definition, policy swings solely based on ideological shifts in Congress, the FCC, or the public are less likely.
Conclusion
Economic concepts own a special place in the social sciences. Like concepts employed in other social sciences, economic concepts provide its practitioners with the tools they need to better understand the workings of the target of their inquiry. Economic concepts, however, also routinely inform and drive policy. This is especially true of the concept of competition. Despite the centrality of the concept of competition to communications policy, however, numerous, foundational questions about the concept persist. Accordingly, in this paper, we have chronicled the evolution of "competition" in economics and also how "competition" has taken shape in the communications arena. We have found that the concept of "e↵ective competition" is central to policy formation at the FCC. Yet, we also have found that the FCC's own applications of "e↵ective competition" are inconsistently applied. Given the importance of this concept, and its inconsistent applications to date, we draw upon the seminal contributions to the notion of e↵ective competition to pro↵er a modern definition that we believe is suitable for application in 21 st century markets.
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